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This research examines the relationship between the number of refugees 
hosted by states and the economic ability of host states by using UNHCR’s refugee 
data and World Bank’s GNI per capita data. To identify the relationship between these 
two variables, this study uses two sets of panel data covering 145-178 countries, 
around 43-55 years and 3000-5000 observations. For the two sets of panel data, four 
models are produced to test the null and alternative hypotheses.  In all four cases, 
results show that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between the 
number of refugees hosted by states and GNI per capita of host states. Thus, this study 
concludes that across time, when GNI per capita or economic ability increases most 
countries tend to receive a fewer number of refugees regardless of their economic 
statuses, such as high-income, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low-
income. 
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 UNFOLDING GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE HISTORICAL 
FEUD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OVER HOSTING 
REFUGEES  
According to the Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017 report, right now one 
in every 110 people is either a refugee, an internally displaced person (IDP) or an 
asylum seeker. The report highlights that 68.5 million people are forcibly displaced 
from their home countries by the end of 2017, which is the highest in recent history.  
To illustrate the severity of the rise in the forcibly displaced population,  16.2 million 
people were newly displaced during just the year 2017. However, the record is not an 
unexpected event. Instead, the number of forcibly displaced people has been steadily 
increasing over time. In 2007, this population was 42.7 million, meaning an increase 
of over 50% in the last decade alone (UNHCR, 2017b). 
Meanwhile, within these 68.5 million forcibly displaced people, 25.4 million are 
refugees, consisting of 19.9 million registered under the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s mandate and 5.4 million Palestinian refugees 
under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) 
(UNHCR, 2017b). Naturally, a question arises that who or which countries host this 




mind, one may expect that wealthy or high-income countries are the ones who host 
the most number of refugees because “it is generally understood that countries with 
strong economies are more likely to be capable of absorbing refugees” (ChartsBin, 
2008). In reality, that hardly appears to be the case, because, in contrast to  “the 
widespread perception that industrialized countries are hosting the bulk of the 
world's refugees, the available statistical evidence demonstrates that most refugees 
remain in their region of origin and flee to neighboring countries” (ChartsBin, 2008).   
Overall, UNHCR (2017) reported a staggering 85% of the refugees under UNCHR’s 
mandate are being hosted in the developing regions, with the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) hosting one-third of this population. Right now, the top five hosts of 
refugees are Turkey with 3.5 million, Pakistan with 1.4 million, Uganda with 1.4 
million, Lebanon with 0.998 million, and the Islamic Republic of Iran with 0.979 
million (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 2). Based on country classification (See Appendix I) by the 
World Bank, none of these countries can be considered as developed nations (UN, 
2012). Among the five top hosts, only Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran are 
considered as upper-middle-income (UMI) countries, and the rest are lower-middle-
income (LMI) and low-income countries (See Appendix II) (UN, 2012). Viewing the 
report, it appears that the refugees are a “Third World Problem” or “Developing 
Countries’ Problem,” (Malkki, 1995);  however, that was not always the case.  
 Historically, the first and second massive refugee crises emerged during and 
after World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) in Europe. The First World War 




the end of the war (Cronin, 2003, p. 156); whereas during WWII, 30 million people 
were displaced, and after the WWII, 11 million people had remained displaced and 
required post-war assistance (Table 1). Though most of these post-war refugees were 
resettled within a few months after the war, there were still many refugees left who 
needed assistance, such as, supporters of the Nazi and Fascist governments, 
Yugoslavian Croats, and two million Soviet citizens (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, 
pp. 21-22). Vernant (1953) classifies these refugees based on nationality and with 
respect to WWII, the categorization is shown in Table 1. 
Pre-War Refugees Post-War Refugees 
Russians, Armenians, 
Spaniards, Victims of the Nazi 
and Fascist regimes  
Jews, Albanians, Balts, Bulgarians, 
Unaccompanied Children, Poles, Hungarians, 
Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, Soviet citizens, 
Yugoslavs, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Chinese, 
The Venezia Giulians, Refugees of German origin  
Table 1:  Categories of Refugees according to Vernant (Vernant, 1953, pp. 54-105) 
 
 The very first point to note in Table 1 is the impact of WWII on the composition 
of refugees. Second, most of the refugees, whether pre-WWII or post-WWII, were 
from Europe, which is at present a hub of developed countries; illustrating that the 
refugees were not always a “Third World Problem.”  
Primarily, the refugee crisis emerged in the Third World in the 1960s during 
the rapid decolonization period (Chimni, 1998, p. 358). As Skran (1995) articulates 
“when multi-ethnic empires have been transformed into homogeneous nation-states, 




358).  Since it was a byproduct of decolonization as well as conflict initiated by the 
colonizers, some scholars blame the developed countries for the refugee crisis in the 
Third World.  
The overwhelming majority of the refugees originate in the Third 
World. The direct causes of their flight are conflicts kept alive mostly by super-
power politics and by weapons forged and manufactured at bargain prices in 
the rich countries, who export death and destruction, and import the natural 
and partly processed products of the poor countries. Nobel (116:29) (Malkki, 
1995, p. 504) 
Figure 1 unfolds the increasing number of global refugees that emerged since 
the decolonization period (The Refugee Project, 2018a). It also displays a growing 
trend of refugees over the last 56 years. Even though there were some periods when 
the number decreased, as a whole, it still demonstrates how the refugee problem has 
grown after the decolonization period.  
 
Figure 1:  Growing Trend of World’s Refugees from 1962- 2016 (Data Source: 






























During the decolonization period refugee problem grew in the South, 
subsequently, the North began to display unwillingness to accept refugees in their 
territory which pointed out by Betts and Loescher (2011) “movements between 
Africa and Europe, and Latin America and North America, overburdened and 
fundamentally changed the asylum policies of the North, leading to an emerging set 
of restrictive practices and border control measures” (p. 9). The restrictive policies of 
the North resulted in an overcrowded refugee burden in the South.  
As the gap grows between the North and the South, the idea of the distribution 
of refugees in accordance with the wealth and the population density of asylum 
country was circulating in the late 1970s (Suhrke, 1998). Known as the global sharing 
of refugees, the goal of this idea was “to assign refugees worldwide by matching 
refugee preferences with host countries ranked according to an index of wealth and 
population density” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397). Another similar proposal developed in 
the early 1990s which urged to “reformulate international refugee law so as to 
develop a global system of responsibility-sharing for refugees” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397). 
The focus of both concepts was to reduce inequalities of refugee sharing among 
refugee recipient states through collective action (Suhrke, 1998).  The problem of 
refugee sharing is also addressed and discussed in international organizations, which 
resulted in refugee quota in developed countries (Suhrke, 1998, p. 397).  
 Therefore, the bizarre feud between the North and the South over who host 
refugees is based on the economic ability and the North’s role in refugee formation. 




the burden of the refugees along with the South since the North has more economic 
ability than the South. They note that the North has “enormous resource capabilities 
relative to those of the South and on the transnational dynamics of social conflict in 
the contemporary world, which at least to some degree makes the North 
coresponsible for the upheavals in the South” (p.279). 
Consequently, a fundamental argument of the refugee problem within the 
international community is hosting refugees. More importantly, the South complains 
that the North is not accommodating enough refugees, even though the North can 
host more refugees than the South. For both the North and the South, economic factor 
remains a major issue that decides who would host refugees, albeit in different ways. 
Hence, the purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the 
economic ability of states and the number of refugees they host, through using large 
data and applying statistical analysis.  
This study is important due to the following reasons. Even though refugee 
problem occupies substantial international attention, International Relations (IR) has 
not developed enough theories around it.   
The discipline of IR has expanded its empirical focus beyond analyzing 
war and peace and issues relating to state and military security to address a 
range of areas such as the global economy, environment, human rights, and 
international trade. However, it has paid comparatively little attention to the 
international politics of forced migration. Despite a strong tradition of looking 
at refugees within international political history, most work on refugees in 
world politics has been based on archival research and has not drawn fully 




emerged, it has been in relatively isolated pockets, often marginalized from 
the mainstream of IR. (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 3) 
Thus, this study will contribute to some IR perspectives. Moreover, another 
concern related to refugee studies is that host states do not receive much attention 
from scholars. Robert Chambers (1986) points out that refugee studies are largely 
limited within refugee-related issues, rather than corresponding relations with host 
countries or communities.  He states, “refugee related research and writing almost 
always start and end with refugees, with hosts either not considered or treated as 
secondary or incidental” (Chambers, 1986, p. 246) and he calls it refugee-centrism 
(Chambers, 1986). As this study is focusing on host related issues, it is leaving the 
traditional refugee centric mentality, and the study is essentially focusing on an 
overlooked issue within refugee studies.  
Lastly, there has not been any large data statistical analysis to see the causal 
relationship between the economic ability of the host countries and the number of 
refugees accommodated by the countries. There is a similar study done by Betts 
(2003), in which he studies burden sharing of refugees among 15 European Union 
(EU) member states. Betts examines whether Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
correlated with the asylum provision of EU member states. He tested the hypothesis 
“there is a positive and significant correlation between GDP and asylum provision as 
a proportion of GDP amongst the 15 EU member states” by using Spearman rank 
correlation test (Betts, 2003: 280). His model includes the GDP of 15 EU member 
between 1993 – 1998 and analyzes GDP rank and asylum provision rank of them. He 




years with the exception of 1994” (Betts, 2003: 284). Thus, he rejected the hypothesis 
for all those years at the 0.05 significant level.  
This study follows the following research process. Chapter 2 captures a broad 
spectrum of perspectives within the complex refugee framework because a lot of 
refugee-related arguments are centralized within the definition of refugee, 
international refugee law, refugee protection, and the international refugee regime. 
This chapter creates a base of this research by conceptualizing those aspects 
associated with refugees. It also discusses how countries refuse to host refugees. 
Chapter 3 begins with the theories regarding the importance of states’ involvement 
in refugee protection. It then covers different factors that influence host countries 
attitudes towards hosting refugees. In Chapter 4, various aspects of refugee hosting 
based on economic ability are discussed. Chapter 5 is all about hypothesis, dependent 
variable, independent variable, control variables, data, and methodology. Chapter 6 
offers the results and analyses. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the previous chapters 








CORE CONCEPTS /CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The Inception of the International Refugee Regime 
WWI and WWII shaped the international refugee regime (Zolberg, Suhrke, & 
Aguayo, 1989; Betts, 2009). International refugee regime refers to the body of law 
that outlines, oversees and regulates the rights, responsibilities, duties, and 
obligations of refugee-related issues such as the behavior of refugee-sending and 
refugee-receiving states as well as refugee protection (Triola, 2014; Betts, 2009, p. 9). 
The notion of creating a refugee regime came from a dual concern: (1) restoring 
international order after WWII, and (2) bringing justice to all the refugees. To restore 
the international order after the Second World War, Europe needed to ensure 
protection and reintegration of the European refugees to create a stable Europe. 
Similarly, ensuring justice at an individual level and providing human rights to the 
WWII refugees were the second reason to create the international refugee regime 
(Betts, 2009, p. 9). Another inclusive reason for creating the international refugee 
regime was that consulting states believed that a refugee regime “would ensure that 
all states made a collective contribution to overcoming a common problem” (Betts, 




A short history behind the creation of the international refugee regime is that 
after WWI, Europe dealt with post-war refugee crisis on an ad hoc basis. During 
WWII, Europe adopted a similar ad hoc approach in supporting refugees. In the early 
stage of WWII, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
established the “relief and refugee” administration in the Middle East. Later in 1943, 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), mainly 
sponsored by the US government, was established “to oversee most of the immediate 
relief and repatriation operations in postwar Europe. But its scope did not extend to 
the longer-term needs of those who could not be returned, and the agency was soon 
caught up in nascent Cold War tensions” (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 22). 
Then again by the end of 1946, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was 
created to handle the last one million unsettled refugees by 1951, and after finishing 
the task, IRO was abolished. As a replacement of the IRO, UNHCR was created by the 
General Assembly (GA) in December 1949 with a mandate of three-year period 
(Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, pp. 22, 23). Later, on December 14th, 1950, it 
became a permanent subsidiary agency of the UN when the GA adopted the UNHCR 
Statute (Feller, 2001, p. 584). The primary responsibility of the UNHCR Statute is to 
supervise the implementation of the 1951 Convention (Betts, 2009, p. 10).    
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which laid out the roles and 
responsibilities of UNHCR, was signed on July 25th, 1951 (Vernant, 1953). Article 35 
of the 1951 Convention has defined UNHCR’s roles in the international community. 




To make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the 
Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with 
information and statistical data 
requested concerning: 
(a) The condition of refugees, 
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and; 
(c) Laws, regulations, and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees (Article 35) (UNHCR, 2010, p. 31) 
Betts interprets that  the UNHCR mandate is a combination of two concepts: 
“(1) to ensure refugees’ access to their rights while in exile and (2) to ensure refugees’ 
timely access to durable solutions (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008)” (Betts, 2009, 
p. 10).  
Currently, UNHCR is the main international organization that is responsible 
for handling, assisting and protecting refugees throughout the world, except for the 
Palestinian refugees (Loescher, 1993, p. 4; Betts, 2009, pp. 9-10). Until 1967, UNHCR 
was resettling and protecting refugees displaced due to WWII, which means it mostly 
concentrated its work in Europe. At the height of decolonization and the Cold War, by 
the end of the 1960s, UNHCR expanded its work in the developing nations by 
providing legal advice and capacity building to protect refugees. Throughout the 
1980s, UNHCR shifted its work towards the South and focused on the South-to-North 
asylum movement, running temporary refugee camps and determining refugee status 
in the South (Betts, 2009). During the 1990s, UNHCR went through a massive 
expansion. As a result, it increased its operation by “providing humanitarian 
assistance to people fleeing the new wars in the former Yugoslavia and sub-Saharan 




involvement in repatriation operations, and even engaging in the protection of IDPs” 
(Betts, 2009, pp. 10-11). By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, UNHCR started 
facing institutional competition from different international organizations as well as 
informal networks such as the International Migration Organization (IOM) and 
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration (IGC). To combat the institutional 
competition, UNHCR strategy moved towards Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and 
irregular migrants along with refugees (Betts, 2009, p. 11). 
Critics argue that “the gradual shift from being a mainly legal and nonpolitical 
actor between the 1950s and 1970s to a more politicized humanitarian actor since 
the 1980s has gradually compromised the moral authority of UNHCR (Goodwin-Gill 
2000)” (Betts, 2009, p. 11). In contrast, supporters of UNHCR disagree with that view, 
as they believe that the shift of UNHCR work as well as the expansion was necessary 
due to its increasing demand and relevance to its work with the states (Betts, 2009, 
p. 11). Away from both debates, Betts (2009) suggests that “over time, persuasion 
based on moral authority has become ever less viable, and UNHCR has relied ever 
more on its ability to appeal to and meet the interests of powerful states to ensure a 
commitment to refugee protection (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008)” (p. 11). 
Nonetheless, UNHCR has very limited power concerning fulfilling its responsibilities 
due to its inadequate material power as well as the dependency on the North to fund 




International Refugee law and Protection of Refugees 
International refugee law and protection of refugees have derived from the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The document covers three areas: 
(1) Refugee Definition, (2) The rights of refugees in asylum country, and (3) States’ 
responsibility towards refugees (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 10). By signing the 
Convention and Protocol states “reaffirm that both treaties are central to the 
international refugee protection system” (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 10).  
Defining Refugee: A Dilemma  
The term ‘refugee’ is controversial as it is surrounded by political opinion and 
confronted by legal jargons. In academia, one group of  scholars demarcates that     
“‘refugee’ is simply a bureaucratic label applied by states for political motives” (Hein, 
1993, p. 44) and another group thinks that the ‘refugee’ status is a political form of 
immigration; yet another group considers ‘refugee’ as a sociological category (Hein, 
1993).  From a simple sociological view, “a refugee is someone who has been 
compelled to abandon his home” (Vernant, 1953, p. 3). In other words, a refugee is 
someone “who is homeless, uprooted; a helpless casualty, diminished in all his 
circumstances, the victim of events for which, at least as an individual, he cannot be 
held responsible” (Vernant, 1953, p. 3). Hence, for Vernant (1953), a victim of natural 
disasters (such as floods and earthquakes), a victim of war and prosecution, a victim 
of climate change, and even a victim of economic disadvantage would be considered 




Vernant provides a nominalist perspective of refugee because for a nominalist, 
‘refugee’ is a social construction (Hein, 1993, p. 44). Moreover, Vernant’s definition of 
refugee presents a very broad view of refugee status, which has been criticized by 
Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989). They argue that the term covers a large number 
of oppressed, suppressed and poor people who are the victim of ‘push’ factors of 
migration (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 4). Instead, they suggest a narrower 
view of refugee, which is “persons whose presence abroad is attributable to a well-
founded fear of violence, as might be established by impartial experts with adequate 
information….and the violence is initiated by some recognizable internal agent, such 
as the government, and directed against dissenters or a specified target group.” 
(Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 33). Thus, their definition of refugee represents 
a realist’s view of refugee as per realist “violence, flight, and exile as definitive of the 
refugee experience” (Hein, 1993, p. 44). Meanwhile, the argument between realists 
and nominalists regarding refugee, as Hein (1993) points out, creates “an uneasy 
coexistence within the field of international migration” (p. 44). However, the 
disagreement of the definition of refugee is not limited within the field of 
international migration, rather, this controversy is unavoidable and perpetuates 
international law   “because defining refugees for purposes of policy implementation 
requires a political choice and an ethical judgment” (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, 
p. 4).  
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not provide the 




countries asylum from persecution” Article 14(1) (Jastram & Achiron, n.p), during 
WWII  the very first time the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugee discussed the 
term 'refugee' (Vernant, 1953). Later the GA first addressed the term ‘refugee’ in the 
fourth session of autumn of 1949 (Jackson, 1999). The 1951 Refugee Convention 
defines the term refugee as follow:   
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall 
apply to any person who: 
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization; 
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee 
Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of 
refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of 
this section; 
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
(UNHCR, 2010) 
Many of the terms in the Refugee Convention vary under interpretation, which 
is why the term causes controversy on occasions. For example, a refugee is someone 
who is “outside the country of his former habitual residence” which implies that 
whoever recognizes himself/herself as a refugee, does not have to flee from his/her 
country of origin. A person can reside in a different county and then can develop well-




uprising against Assad government started in 2011, and then he/she was too afraid 
to go back to Syria, this type of refugee is defined as refugees sur place (Gibney, 2010). 
Another situation can arise when a person is already residing outside of his/her 
country of origin, but while staying in the foreign land he/she develops and adopts or 
expresses certain political or other views which might be forbidden in his country of 
origin and endanger his existence in his country of origin. In that case, the person can 
be recognized as a refugee under the notion that he/she has well-founded fear 
(Gibney, 2010).  
Likewise, the interpretations of ‘well-founded fear’ also create debate. 
Essentially the debate is which fear it is referring to subjective fear or objective fear 
or both (Gibney, 2010). Meanwhile, the dominant view is that in this sense ‘fear’ 
means the actual state of mind of the claimant; nevertheless, there has to be  “some 
objective criteria upon which this (subjective) fear could be based” (Gibney, 2010, p. 
14). However, this view is not ubiquitously well received because some people can 
express themselves, while some other cannot; thus, the people who cannot express 
themselves might end up with no protection (Gibney, 2010). Similarly, the term 
persecution is debatable, but “the prospect of the denial of certain rights such as 
freedom from torture, the right to life, and liberty of the person, would constitute 
persecution” (Gibney, 2010, p. 17).  
Apart from those factors, without showing a tie with the five elements of 
refugee definition, a. Race, b. Religion c. Nationality, d. Political opinion or, e. 




even if he /she shows well-founded fear and persecution. However, a fundamental 
problem with these five elements is their definitions and meaning. To illustrate, there 
is no definition of race in the Refugee Convention, but UNHCR Handbook defines race 
as such “the term race…has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds 
of ethnic groups that are referred to as ‘races’ in the common usage” (Gibney, 2010, 
p. 18). Even though there is no precise definition of race, the International Covenant 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) defines the term 
racial discrimination as follow  
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life. (ICERD, 1965) 
ICERD’s racial discrimination provides a background of what racial 
discrimination can be; however, the real challenge is measuring racial discrimination 
that can show that the claims of the oppressed are correct and can receive refugee 
status (Gibney, 2010). Consequently, the notion of nationality in the Refugee 
Convention does not refer to citizenship, rather it primarily means an ethnic or 
linguistic minority within a specific society (Gibney, 2010, p. 20).  
The term “nationality” in this context is not to be understood only as 
“citizenship”. It refers also to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group and 
may occasionally overlap with the term “race”. Persecution for reasons of 
nationality may consist of adverse attitudes and measures directed against a 
national (ethnic, linguistic) minority and in certain circumstances the fact of 
belonging to such a minority may in itself give rise to well-founded fear of 





The co-existence within the boundaries of a State of two or more 
national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create situations of conflict and also 
situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may not always be easy 
to distinguish between persecution for reasons of nationality and persecution 
for reasons of political opinion when a conflict between national groups is 
combined with political movements, particularly where a political movement 
is identified with a specific “nationality”. (par. 75) 
 
Whereas in most cases persecution for reason of nationality is feared 
by persons belonging to a national minority, there have been many cases in 
various continents where a person belonging to a majority group may fear 
persecution by a dominant minority. (par. 76) (UNHCR, 1979, p. 13) 
 
Talking about political opinion of a person, Gibney states that “political 
dissident who expresses views in opposition to the ruling government… including 
opinions on any matter in which state policy is involved” (Gibney, 2010, p. 19) either 
through speeches, writing or political behavior.   
Another problem with the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
is that it had not addressed the refugee crisis that emerged in the early 1960s during 
the decolonization period. Thus, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
ended geographical and time limits from the Convention, was adopted in 1967  
(Jastram & Achiron, n.p). Moreover, refugee definition in the Refugee Convention 
does not address the problem of external fear such as aggression from another state. 
Hence, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) added the phrase: “‘refugee’ shall also 
apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of 
his country of origin or nationality” (OAU, 1969) in the AU Convention Governing 




To sum up, the term refugee can be portraited in different ways depending on 
who is defining it. Thus, the term will always be controversial. However, the term is 
particularly important because whether a person receive refugee status or not 
depends on the definition of refugee; and for many asylum seekers it is a question of 
life and death (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989), “because refugee status is an 
entitlement given to those who qualify for access to certain international legal 
protections and resources outside of their home country” (Cronin, 2003, p. 155). 
Whether or not the term refugee is defined precisely in the Refugee Convention 
“today [it] is the only known phenomenon whereby a sovereign state and a person of 
foreign nationality, representing only his or her own person, interact with each other, 
to advance their claims for, respectively, sovereignty and protection” (Sicakkan, 2012, 
p. 359).  
The Rights of the Refugees 
The four elements that constitute the rights of refugees are non-
discrimination, non-penalization, non-refoulement and standards of treatment of 
refugees (UNHCR, 2010, p. 3). The Convention stipulates that refugees should not be 
facing any racial, religious or country of origin discrimination. Additionally, under 
international human rights law refugees should not be discriminated based on their 
gender, age, disability, or other prohibited ground of discrimination (UNHCR, 2010, 
p. 3). The Convention prohibits penalization of refugees for their illegal entry or stay. 




refugees or refoulment of refugees to a place where they might face persecution or 
endanger their life and freedom1 (UNHCR, 2010; Jastram & Achiron, n.p). 
Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement is known as a rule of customary 
international law which implies “that even States that are not party to the Refugee 
Convention must respect the principle of non-refoulement” (Jastram & Achiron, n.p, p. 
14). In other words, a state cannot prevent refugees who are seeking protection 
because it violates the non-refoulement law (UNHCR, 2015, p. 5). Lastly, refugees are 
entitled to receive access to court, employment, primary education, rationing, 
housing (Article 21), relief, exemption from reciprocity and travel documents from 
the host government. Refugees are also obligated to maintain law and regulation of 
the host country (UNHCR, 2015, Article 2).  
Role of a Host State 
“In international law, while a state has the right to grant asylum, there is no 
corresponding right of an individual to be granted asylum” (Melander, 1981, p. 35). 
Even though the states are not required to grant asylum, they cannot expel refugees 
from their territory even if they think that refugees will disturb national security and 
public order (Article 32); and also because of the non-refoulement law (Article 33) 
states cannot send back the refugees to their country of origin against their will. 
Additionally, states cannot punish or impose penalties on the refugees because of 
                                                        
1 “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 




their illegal entrance (Article 31). The Convention confirms that the host states shall 
provide rationing (Article 20), housing (Article 21), public education (Article 22), 
public relief (Article 23), social security (Article 24) and employment (Chapter III). 
The international refugee law also ensures that refugees have the rights to receive 
certain facilities from the host states such as administrative assistance (Article 25), 
freedom of movement (Article 26), identity papers (Article 27), travel documents 
(Article 28), tax exemption (Article 29), permit to assets transfer (Article 30), and 
naturalization (Article 34). Furthermore, by signing the Convention, states agree to 
work and cooperate with UNHCR (Article 35); and they are also required to adopt 
national law that ensures the application of the Convention (UNHCR, 2015; Jastram & 
Achiron, n.p). Finally, when a state accedes the 1951 Refugee Convention, it adopts 
the following values  
• It demonstrates its commitment to treating refugees in accordance with 
internationally recognized legal and humanitarian standards; 
• It gives refugees a possibility to find safety; 
• It helps to avoid friction between States over refugee questions. Granting 
asylum is a peaceful, humanitarian and legal act rather than a hostile 
gesture, and should be understood by the refugee’s country of origin as 
such; 
• It demonstrates its willingness to share the responsibility for protecting 
refugees; and it helps UNHCR to mobilize international support for the 
protection of refugees (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7) 
 
The main challenge with the international refugee law is that states do not 
have any legal obligation towards the refugees in other states. Meanwhile, if states 
sign the Refugee Convention, then they have some legal obligation to support the 
refugees within their state territory, but they do not have any obligation towards the 




any obligation towards any refugees. This condition creates a vacuum within the 
refugee system. In other words, taking responsibility for refugees or supporting 
refugees is a burden that nobody wants, but some countries take the burden, and 
others do not. Hence, for many countries, especially the North, supporting refugees in 
the South is an option, not an obligation (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 19). 
 For this reason, the North only shows interest towards certain refugees when 
“the politics of other issue-areas has been crucial for defining the interests that have 
shaped the engagement or disengagement of Northern states in the refugee problem 
in the Global South” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 19). Additionally, some academics 
claim that the 1951 Refugee Convention is very Euro-centric, outdated, and so 
inflexible that it does not address current refugee challenges; such as economic 
migrants and asylum seekers, “the range of security concerns associated with refugee 
movements, the costs to states associated with granting asylum , and the growing 
scale and globalization of the problem of forced migrants” (Loescher, Betts, & Milner, 
2008, p. 98). 
Resolving the Refugee Problem: Three Ways 
Ideally, decisions regarding the resolution of any refugee situation 
should be made by the refugees themselves. Through international 
instruments such as the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
as well as national legislation, refugees are guaranteed the right to remain in 
exile while they fear that their lives might be in danger should they return 
home. (Collins, 1996, p. 2) 
Academics and scholars have agreed that voluntary repatriation, integration 




three durable solutions of refugee problem (Melander, 1981, p. 35; Hein, 1993, p. 48; 
Collins, 1996, p. 2). Voluntary repatriation means that when refugees willingly want 
to go back to their home country without violating the notion of non-refoulement.  For 
most of the refugees who stay in the country of first asylum, voluntary repatriation is 
the only choice even after many years of residing in that country (Hein, 1993, p. 50). 
Moreover, most of the time the refugees do not have any voice in the decision of going 
back to their home state rather the decision usually taken by the organization and 
governments (Collins, 1996).  Voluntary repatriation practice became popular in the 
early 1980s among the UN agencies, governments and non-governmental 
organizations (Collins, 1996). While the practice is very popular, quite a few 
researchers point out that this solution lacks research as well as evidence that it is a 
durable solution to the refugee problem. For example, Chimni argues “voluntary 
repatriation has not been adequately researched and that there are situations and 
contexts in which it is far from being the ideal solution” (Chimni, 1998, p. 364). In 
contrast, for refugees, returning home is a cost-benefit analysis between desirability 
to return home and remain as a refugee (Collins, 1996, p. 32). For the refugees, 
decision-making process includes many factors such as security, availability of 
employment, food, land, fuel, healthcare, education, and other services. If the benefit 
of returning home is higher than staying as a refugee, then voluntary repatriation has 
a high possibility  (Collins, 1996, p. 32).  
Local integration, on the other hand, is the most neglected solutions of the 




refugees into the local community of first asylum country with the condition that the 
refugees have granted asylum in that country (Melander, 1981; Jacobsen, 2003; 
Goodwin-Gill, 2014). States are not obliged to settle refugees in their territory, 
however, local integration happens when even after a long period of time the refugees 
are not safe to go back their country of origin and at that time a host government can 
consider integrating refugees into the local community without giving them any 
permanent residence and citizenship (Jacobsen, 2003). Local integration has three 
dimensions, addressed by Alexandra Fielden (2008), “Firstly, it is a legal process, 
whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Secondly, it is an 
economic process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living 
comparable to the host community. Thirdly, it is a social and cultural process of 
adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of 
the host country and live without fear of discrimination” (p. 1). Local integration is 
very different from full integration because full integration means providing 
permanent residency, granted asylum including social, economic and civil rights by 
the host government (Jacobsen, 2003). Meanwhile, local integration raises security, 
economic and environmental concerns, as well as local community’s integration 
capability concern; thus, “the success of local integration depends on the cooperation 
of host governments, the local community, and the refugees themselves. If such a 
program threatens the security and stability of either the local community or the 




Among the three solutions of the refugee problem, resettlement is the least 
adopted solution (Hein, 1993, p. 48). To articulate, Chimni states “Around 50 million 
refugees were resettled between 1912 to 1969; however, now resettlement of 
refugee is the least desirable and consider only if they have special needs” (Chimni, 
1998, p. 364).  Resettlement was an integral part of the refugee solution right after 
WWII as well as during the Cold War because during those periods the West 
advocated resettlement as a durable solution. However, resettlement in the West 
declined after the end of Cold War and right now less than one percent refugees are 
offered resettlement (Chimni, 1998, pp. 363,364).  Ultimately, the declining nature of 
resettlement in the West increased the burden of refugees in Third World countries. 
Moreover, the chances of resettlement of a refugee do not determine by the time a 
refugee has been waiting rather it depends on other factors such as medical and other 
needs (McAdam, 2013).  At present, the UNHCR decides resettlement of refugees 
under the following conditions: 
• “Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs of the refugee in the country of 
refuge (this includes a threat of refoulement) 
• Survivors of Torture and/or Violence, where repatriation or the 
conditions of asylum could result in further traumatization and/or 
heightened risk, or where appropriate treatment is not available 
• Medical Needs, in particular life-saving treatment that is unavailable in the 
country of refuge 
• Women and Girls at Risk, who have protection problems particular to their 
gender 
• Family Reunification, when resettlement is the only means to reunite 
refugee family members who, owing to refugee flight or displacement, are 
separated by borders or entire continents 
• Children and Adolescents at Risk, where a best interests determination 
supports resettlement, and 
• Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions, which generally is 




when resettlement can be used strategically, and/or when it can open 
possibilities for comprehensive solutions.” (Karlsen, 2016) 
 
Meanwhile, resettlement in a third world country is not always successful, 
especially in low income countries. In the report Refugee Resettlement in Developing 
Countries, Stefan Sperl and Irinel Brădişteanu (2004) discuss the result of a Pilot 
Project that took place between 1997-2001. Under the project, 226 refugees from 
Africa were resettled in Benin, and Burkina Faso because both countries are 
“politically stable, respect the terms of the 1951 Convention and have a generous 
asylum policy” (p.4). However, the project had failed because of the lack of 
government resources and knowledge, lack of employment opportunities and 
financial capabilities (Sperl & Brădişteanu, 2004). Additionally, Loescher (1993) 
claims that because of many “wide-ranging economic, social, and political reasons, the 
majority of the world’s refugees are not offered permanent asylum or the opportunity 
to integrate into local communities by most of the Third World governments. Rather, 
they are kept separate and dependent on external assistance provided by the 
international community” (pp. 8-9). Thus, resettlement in developed countries is a 
durable solution, but developed countries are “increasingly reluctant to provide 
resettlement and local integration to refugees” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 18). They 
rather prefer “and have instead promoted repatriation as ‘the preferred durable 
solution” (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p. 18). Likewise, local integration is not a likeable 
solution to the host governments, and it needs many processes to succeed. In contrast, 




has the resource to support the refugees. Thus, all these solutions depend on many 
variables and can be durable and not durable based on different contexts.  
Strategies Used by the States to Prevent Refugees 
 
Asylum States’ Restriction by Using the Definition of Refugee 
As noted earlier in Chapter 2, that refugee status determined by the definition 
of ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. However, 
countries tend to manipulate the interpretation and use this as a prevention 
technique to restrict refugees from asylum; “as refugee crises multiply, governments 
are tending to interpret the criteria in a narrow sense” (Grahl-Madsen, 1982, p. 69). 
To illustrate, Swedish Aliens Act (Utldnningslag) 1980 offers that the term 
‘persecution’ would only be effective if the ‘persecution’ “threatens a person's life or 
freedom or which otherwise is of a serious nature” (Grahl-Madsen, 1982, p. 69).  
Not Signing the 1951 Refugee Convention 
A major question raised during the Syrian refugee crisis was ‘why the major 
gulf countries or the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members: 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, are not 
taking refugees?’ (Fantz, Anderson, & Elwazer, 2015; Kinninmont, 2015; Khazaal, 
2015). To answer this question, analysts point out that these countries have not 
signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, as a consequence,  they do not recognize refugee 




standard treatment and rights typically afforded those seeking refuge in a new 
country” (Khazaal, 2015).  Since they opted out from the international refugee law, in 
GCC countries, refugees are not entitled to receive any rights and facilities that are 
proclaimed by the Refugee Convention. However, it is not true that these countries 
have not received any refugees rather as they do not recognize refugee status of 
refugees, and there is a lack of official record of the number of unrecognized refugees 
in GCC states (Khazaal, 2015). These unrecognized refugees are treated as  guest 
workers  of  GCC work-sponsorship program, as a result, they are vulnerable because 
under the work-sponsorship program they “are not allowed to change jobs or exit the 
country without their employer’s permission regardless of the working conditions or 
treatment to which they are subjected” (Khazaal, 2015). Meanwhile, the refugees also 
know that they are not going to receive any assistance from these countries for being 
refugees, thus they prefer “embarking on a dangerous trip across the Mediterranean 
to seek refuge, rather than traveling just 2,000 km to seek a work residency permit in 
a country like Saudi Arabia” (Khazaal, 2015).  
Implementing Border Control 
Countries use border control as a tactic to restrict refugee to enter their soil. 
In 2015 European countries started facing a refugee crisis, during that time 
approximately 5000 refugees per day attempted to enter southern Europe  
(Granados, Murphy, Schaul, & Faiola, 2016). The refugees were traveling through the 




year migrant influx into Europe. Of the near-million refugees that reached Germany 
in 2015, 800,000 of them passed through the Route” (CES, n.p). The route starts from 
Turkey to either Greece or Bulgaria then Macedonia to Serbia then Hungary or Croatia 
and after that Austria or Slovenia and then other European Countries as illustrated in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Refugees Used the Balkan Route to Enter Europe (Granados, Murphy, 
Schaul, & Faiola, 2016) 
 
As the number of refugees grew, Hungary constructed a 109-mile fence with 
bordering Croatia, resulted in a drop of refugees entering Hungary. As a consequence, 




so do Austria and Germany (Granados, Murphy, Schaul, & Faiola, 2016), which can be 
seen in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Countries that Built Fence in Their Border to Restrict Refugee 
Migration (CES, n.p) 
 
However, asylum countries who share a border with home countries can also 
limit refugee inflow by closing border. For instance, Turkey stated constructing a 900 













INVOLVEMENT OF STATES TOWARDS REFUGEE PROTECTION 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, different theoretical 
frameworks and arguments of refugee protection will be discussed. The second part 
includes several factors that states consider while they involve in refugee protection 
or to host refugees. The last part explores various factors states consider when they 
want to restrict refugee migration in their territory. 
The Importance of Involvement of States in Refugee Protection 
Theoretical Framework 
The idea, that protection of refugees is a global public good2, was first 
introduced by Suhrke (Betts, 2009; Suhrke, 1998). Betts provided an extended 
explanation of her remark. He observes refugee protection offers two non-excludable 
benefits: international order and justice (Betts, 2009). He narrates that through 
effective refugee protection refugees can be reintegrated in the nation-state system, 
which prevents them from becoming stateless. When refugees integrate into the 
nation-state system, it decreases the likelihood that they will become a source of 
                                                        
2 “A public good is a good that has the properties of non-excludability and nonrivalry. In other 
words, once provided, the benefits conferred by the good (1) cannot be excluded from all the other 
members of the community and (2) do not diminish or become scarce when enjoyed by another actor” 




conflict or states’ insecurity. He notes that in the past lack of effective refugee 
protection resulted in recruitment of refugees by terrorist organizations or guerrilla 
movements (Betts, 2009, pp. 26, 27). He also denotes that refugee protection is a 
source of international justice because when some states cannot ensure the basic 
human rights of their citizens, other states take the responsibility. By ensuring 
international order and justice, states assure global public benefit (Betts, 2009, pp. 
26, 27). 
However, the lack of a global government causes challenges, and like other 
public goods, the concern is ‘free riders,’ as Suhrke explains “if one state admits 
refugees, others will benefit from the greater international order that ensues 
regardless of their own admissions. As a result, all will be tempted to cheat by letting 
'the other' state do the job” (Suhrke, 1998, p. 400). As no one wants to share the 
burden of refugees, but still wants to enjoy global peace and order, it creates a 
collective action problem. She explains this through the Prisoner’s Dilemma3.  She 
argues that states would gain more if they work collectively than unilaterally to solve 
the refugee problem, even though they think that unilateral action is more attainable 
than collective action. Nevertheless, she believes collective action is possible as it 
happens in many areas such as security and climate change (Suhrke, 1998).  Like 
                                                        
3 Mainly derived from game theory, however, here it implies “in a two-actor model, each of 
two states may prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD) yet one state may be even 
better off when it can benefit from the unrequited cooperation of the other actor (DC). However, 
being the state that behaves cooperatively without a reciprocal response (CD) is the least desirable 
outcome. Consequently, the preference ordering of states is DC > CC > DD > CD. In a single 
interaction, payoff through defection. Consequently, even though both states have a common interest 
in achieving the CC outcome, acting individually, they will end up at the suboptimal DD outcome” 




Suhrke’s idea, Kim Salomon (1991) analyzes that as states cannot act alone to solve 
the refugee problem, so they created institutions through which they can address the 
problem, for example, UNHCR. Thus, through multilateral cooperation among 
international organizations and states, refugee problem can be resolved (Cronin, 
2003, pp. 157-158).     
Meanwhile, Bruce Cronin (2003) offers a new explanation. He argues that 
refugee protection is a part of stabilizing nation-state system which would help to 
create a coherent international order (Cronin, 2003, p. 158). This idea was developed 
by observing situations of Post WWI and WWII refugee emergence and their 
protections. He examines “the interwar regime reflected the belief in ethnicity and 
nationality as the foundation of the nation-state, while the post-World War II system 
was based on the rights of the individual and the protection of basic human rights” 
(Cronin, 2003, p. 158); and as a result, “two contradictory principles in the creation 
of new political orders: (1) the sovereign right of states to control their borders; (2) 
the need to protect those forced to flee their countries in the wake of postwar state-
building activities” (Cronin, 2003, p. 158). Thus, states involve in refugee protection 
to create a stable nation-state system by “absorbing those [‘unaffiliated’] who did not 
fit within this system” (Cronin, 2003, p. 158).   
Factors that Encourage States to Host Refugees  
When a refugee crisis occurs, a state has three choices: it can (1) stay behind 




(3) respond negatively towards them (Jacobsen, 1996). When a state decides to host 
refugees, it gets involved in refugee protection (Cronin, 2003). To explain the reasons 
for this phenomenon, scholars take different approaches such as strategic interest, 
international necessity and humanitarian issue (Cronin, 2003, p. 156; Betts, 2009). 
Gil Loescher and John Scanlan (1986) argue that foreign policy objective is the 
dominant factor towards the refugee policy of the US government. They examine 
“foreign policy choices ordinarily have played the key role in determining which 
refugees to be permitted to enter the United States” (p. xvii). They observe that, after 
1945, domestic lobbyist groups, as well as humanitarian groups, have some impact 
on the US refugee policy.  However, their impacts are not as much as the foreign policy 
group inside the government who “believe that refugees are not merely immigrants 
and not merely victims, but are also valuable “assets” in an ongoing struggle with 
Communism” (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. xvii). During Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson and Ford administrations the USA admitted countless Hungarians, Cubans, 
and Indochinese refugees as a part of  the Cold War strategies; in contrast, during the 
same period of time the US government denied countless Salvadorans and Haitians 
who were fleeing persecution of the authoritarian regimes (Loescher & Scanlan, 
1986, p. xvii). In another book the UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Loescher 
(2001) points out that the Western governments, especially the US government, used 
refugees from the Communist States and UNHCR as political tools to win the Cold War 




Recognizing persecution and identifying its perpetrators caused no headaches 
and the grant of as asylum was generally used to reaffirm the failures of 
communism and the benevolence of the West. The UNHCR proved valuable to 
the West as an agency able to handle flows out of Eastern Europe for 
resettlement in the ‘Free World’, particularly after the 1956 Hungarian 
Uprising. International refugee policy not only saved many individuals who 
were subject to repression in communist dictatorships, but it also clearly 
served the geopolitical interests of the United States and its allies (Loescher, 
2001). 
While Loescher only shows the relationship between foreign policy and state’s 
involvement in refugee protection, Alexander Betts (2009) suggests a broader 
perspective on the issue of state’s interest in refugee protection in the book Protection 
by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime. His main argument is 
that when states have own interests such as security, foreign policy, migration, trade, 
peacebuilding, and development, then they involve in refugee protection; conversely, 
when they do not have their own interest, they do not participate in refugee 
protection (pp. 19-20).  He argues that “When states had wider interests in other issue 
areas and perceived them to be connected to refugee protection, they were 
sometimes persuaded to contribute to refugee protection beyond their territory” 
(Betts, 2009, p. 20). In contrast “When these wider interests were absent or only 
tenuously connected to the refugee issue, states rarely had a clear incentive to 
voluntarily contribute to supporting refugee protection” (Betts, 2009, p. 20). For 
example, security, migration, and trade are some of the areas that liked to the wider 
interest of the North; these factors provide some incentives to the North to share 
refugee burden in the South. He calls the idea as cross-issue persuasion (Betts, 2009, 




Meanwhile, Karen Jacobsen (1996) provides some different angles in this 
issue. She examines “why some host governments respond in relatively generous 
ways, while other governments act more restrictively” (p. 655) towards refugees. She 
analyzes that as a host, developed countries and LDCs have different attitudes 
towards refugees because of their different economic conditions which shape their 
corresponding refugee policy (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 656). She identifies four factors that 
influence LDC governments to determine to host refugees: “1) bureaucratic choices 
made by the government; 2) international relations; 3) the absorption capacity of the 
local host community; and 4) national security consideration” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 
660).  
She discusses that the bureaucratic choices taken by a host government affect 
refugees. To illustrate, if the refugees were to be tended by the Social Welfare Branch 
of government, then the refugees would be better off. In contrast, if the army of the 
host government were to take control of refugees, then they might not be in good 
conditions. She elucidates this by an example: in 1975, Cambodian refugees in 
Thailand were under Thai Defense Force, as a result, the refugees had very restricted 
movement and faced inhuman condition inside the camp; whereas in 1980, 
Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe were under the Social Welfare Department; as a 
result, they lived in more humane conditions (Jacobsen, 1996).  She addresses that 
refugees can also be used as pawns of international politics. International pressure 
such as negative publicity and need for aid assistance from the international 




government can even use refugee policy as a tactic to embarrass or pressurize the 
home government (Jacobsen, 1996). 
Moreover, promises of resettlement in a third country also influence LDCs to 
host refugees.  Additionally, Jacobsen discusses the relationship between the host and 
the home governments and how that relationship influences the host government’s 
decision to take refugees. She describes this as “Haitian-Cuban Syndrome,” which 
indicates that in the 1980s when the Cuban asylum seekers were coming to the USA, 
the US government was taking them willingly even though many of them could not 
show that they faced prosecution. But the US government provided asylum to those 
Cubans due to the fact that the US government had an adverse relationship with the 
communist regime of Cuba. On the other hand, asylum seekers from Haiti who faced 
a similar situation had not given refugee status because the US government had a 
friendly relationship with the Haitian government. A similar event happened between 
Afghan and Iranian refugees in Pakistan, where Pakistan government treated Afghan 
refugees better than the Iranian ones (Jacobsen, 1996).  Additionally, Jacobsen 
discusses local absorption capacity, a combined measure for “social, economic and 
cultural factors which affect the local receiving communities’ response to refugees,” 
that represents the extent of communities’ willingness and capability of 
accommodating refugees (Jacobsen, 1996, p.666). She added that local economic 
capacity, which includes employment situation, infrastructure, land availability and 
land capacity, is one of the main factors that influence the governments from 




Apart from different political science approaches, Egon F. Kunz (1981) 
provides a sociological framework of hosting refugees. Kunz discusses home and 
host-related factors that determine the refugees’ consideration of host states and host 
attitudes towards refugees (Kunz, 1981). From his perspective, home-related factors 
are “identification/ marginality: the majority identified, the events alienated, self-
alienated; attitude to fight and homeland: respective fate-groups, purpose groups; 
ideological-national orientation abroad: restoration activities, the passive hurt, 
integration realists, eager assimilationists, revolutionary activities, founders of 
utopias” (Kunz, 1981, p. 44). Home-related factors identify refugees, their types and 
factors related to their identity. 
On the other hand, host related factors are: “cultural compatibility: language, 
values, traditions, religion, politics, food, and interpersonal relations; population 
policies: augmentative and self-sufficient; social attitudes: monistic-assimilationist, 
pluralistic- integrationist and sanctuary societies –tolerant” (Kunz, 1981, p. 47).  Kunz 
discusses that cultural compatibility is important for refugees as they can relate 
themselves with host country’s society when they can communicate “and share their 
values, traditions, lifestyle, religion, political views food habits, and they are able to 
anticipate and evaluate their actions and responses, the integration will be 
accelerated and eventual identification with the new country” (Kunz, 1981, p. 47).  He 
brings the example of how South Africans and Rhodesians were very comfortable in 
Canada and Australia. Meanwhile, the population policy of the host countries is a 




underpopulated augmentative societies or countries would welcome refugees 
because refugees contribute to the economic growth; whereas, overpopulated self-
sufficient countries have fewer incentives to take a large number of refugees as they 
are already self-sufficient. Lastly, he discusses social attitudes toward refugees that 
influences refugee flows.  According to Kunz, monistic (assimilationist) societies are 
more hostile to the people from other societies, compared to the pluralistic 
(integrationist) societies and sanctuary (tolerant) societies.  
Factors that Discourage States to Host Refugees  
Prejudice Against Refugees 
To a refugee receiving society, refugees are symbols of instability, isolation, 
and unknown (Vernant, 1953, p. 13). The identities of the refugees create cultural and 
racial prejudice against refugees in a host country. Those prejudices work as 
determinant factors for hosting governments because “tensions may also arise from 
the consequences of admitting outsiders into traditional social structures” (Loescher, 
1993, p. 8). As an example, Melander (1981) points out that Latin American and 
African countries had admitted a considerable number of refugees from European 
countries in the past; in contrast, European countries have paid little attention to the 
refugee problem of those two continents. In other words, they have not admitted a 
considerable number of refugees in Europe from Africa and Latin America due to fear 




In 2017, Trump administration imposed a travel ban on refugees from seven 
predominantly Muslim majority countries, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, 
and Yemen, because the US government wanted to exclude “radical Islamic terrorists” 
in the territory of the USA. In the same executive order, President Trump also 
instructed to favor Christians refugees as well as refugees from other minority groups 
over Muslim refugees (Shear & Cooper, 2017). Arguably because of the racial and 
religious prejudice of the Trump administration towards the Muslim refugees, the 
travel ban was imposed. 
Researchers indicate that politicians can shape public opinion and prejudice 
towards refugees. To illustrate, in Australia politicians have been using dehumanizing 
and polarizing languages to isolate refugees and to shape public opinion (Blair & 
Alam, 2018). Blair and Alam analyze that in Australia public opinion towards “asylum 
seekers” is very different from “refugees” mainly because “political leaders typically 
use the notion of genuineness to differentiate refugees from their supposedly non-
genuine counterparts, asylum seekers travelling to Australia by boat” (Blair & Alam, 
2018). Even though under the 1951 Refugee Convention in both situations all of them 
are refugees, but Australian politicians call those refugees “queue jumping” asylum 
seekers who are arriving there by boat and “genuine” refugees who are coming 
through humanitarian entrants program (Blair & Alam, 2018). By doing so, they 
shape public opinion towards refugees.  
Prejudice towards refugees can also come from different parts of society, for 




anti-Muslim support group, who invokes the anti-Muslim movement in Germany. As 
a result, many refugees in Germany are facing racial attacks due to xenophobia (Perry, 
2015). Hence, racial, cultural, religious and other prejudice invoke the public and 
political opinion against refugees; and can impact a states’ decision to pursue refugee 
protection.  
Security Concern 
Many governments consider refugees as a national threat. Usually, refugees 
represent a minority group such as ethnic, religious, political and economic. Isolated 
in a host society, they look for safety within the group of people who share a similar 
identity (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). For many governments, this cluster of a minority 
group is a concerning fact because they would increase the member of a minority 
group and the group might “disrupt the precarious existing order of racial, religious, 
and ethnic balance” (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). Governments also have  a concern to host 
refugees from neighboring countries because of the “fear of endangering political 
relations, fear of encouraging a mass influx, or fear of admitting ideologically 
incompatible groups of persons” (Loescher, 1993, p. 8). A similar concern was 
articulated by Weiner (1996). He argues that if refugees arrive in a large number, they 
can threaten “political regime, cultural identity, socio-economic order and 
environment” in the local context (Suhrke, 1998, p. 401). They will create a national 
threat if they have a military affliction with the conflict that they fled. He also claims 




its neighbours”  (Suhrke, 1998, p. 401). In the time of globalization, the concern goes 
beyond the national border. Utpala Rahman (2010) examines political, human, 
economic, social and environmental security in Bangladesh regarding hosting 
Rohingya refugees. She points out that Rohingya refugees are vulnerable and 
desperate as a result they get involved with different militant groups such as the 
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization 
(RSO), which are afflicted with Islamic militant groups. There had been few terrorist 
incidents in which Bangladeshi security forces found connections with RSO. There are 
more security threats such as illegal drug smuggling, and arms trade in the border 
area (Rahman, 2010, pp. 235-238). Thus, host countries take the risk of security by 
hosting refugees. Many governments would not like take that risk, and they might be 
unwilling to host refugees because of their security concern.  
To sum up this chapter and before moving to the next chapter, the whole 
scenario of the literature review that discusses the factors that encourage and 





Figure 4: All the Influential Factors that Encourage or Discourage a State to 
Host Refugees (Model based on the Literature Review)  
 
Scholars think that national interest, local economic capacity, international 
assistant, foreign policy, home-host relationship, cultural compatibility, distance, and 
population are the influential factors for the states to host refugees; whereas security 
concern and prejudice are reasons when they hold back. Some of these factors have 
physical attribute and measurable such as distance, population, economic capability, 
and international assistant. On the other hand, national interest, home-host 
relationship, foreign policy, security concern, and prejudice have non-physical 


































Based on the literature review presented in Chapter 3 and Figure 4, the 
following assumption can be made. 
Number of Refugees host by a State = function (National Interest, Economic 
Capacity/economic ability, International Assistant, Foreign Policy, Host-Home 
Relationship, Cultural Compatibility, Distance, Population Policy) 
 
The equation implies that the number of refugees hosted by a state depends 
on national interest, economic capacity, international assistant, foreign policy, home-
host relationship, cultural compatibility, distance, and population policy of host 
country. Meanwhile, national interest, foreign policy, and home-host relationship are 
non-physical characteristics as well as they carry similar attributes and can be 
interrelated. For example, if there is a good relationship between home-host 
countries then the host country will be linear towards the home country because of 
the national interest and foreign policy; and because of those of reasons bringing 
refugees from that home country will be restricted. Similarly, cultural compatibility 
is a non-physical characteristic and often depends upon the refugees rather than host 
country because sometimes refugees take decision based on cultural compatibility 
and in which the host state does not play any straight role (Kunz, 1981).  In contrast, 
international assistant such as donation is a physical attribute but most of the time 
only important for the developing countries and not for the developed countries. 
However, most of these variables such as international assistant and home-
host relationship, do not have relevant data for each country for every year. Some of 




interest. Thus, only economic ability, distance, and population policy were considered 
for this research because of the avaiability of data; and they have a significant impact 
on the decision of hosting refugees. Besides, the main goal of this study is look at the 
correlation between economic ability of host states and the number of refugees 

























ECONOMIC ABILITY AND HOSTING REFUGEES 
There is no definitive definition of economic ability in economics and political 
science.  Cambridge dictionary refers ‘ability’ as “the power or skill needed to do 
something” (Dictionary, 2018). However, using ‘power’ in a definition can provide a 
different meaning because there is an existing term ‘economic power’ which defined 
as “the ability to control or influence the behavior of others through the deliberate 
and politically motivated use of economic assets” (Frost, 2018). Therefore, economic 
ability cannot be defined as “the economic power” to do something. In contrast, 
Google dictionary interprets ‘ability’ as “possession of the means or skill to do 
something” (Google, 2018). Consequently, ‘means’ has many synonyms such as 
income, wealth, revenue and earnings, which will be a better fit for this research.  
For this study, economic ability of states denotes the possession of means by 
states, in this case ‘means’ refers to income, wealth, revenue and earnings of states. 
There are no measures of economic ability but some of the possible indicators of 
economic ability can be the wealth of a state, gross domestic product (GDP), gross 
national income (GNI), and gross national product (GNP). All these suggested 
indicators are interconnected because they demonstrate similar types of economic 




income from gross domestic products; whereas GNI includes income collected from 
overseas along with domestic income from the domestic product (Investopedia, 
2018b). Meanwhile, GNP is equivalent to GNI as suggested by the World Bank, which 
“uses terminology in line with the 1993 System of National Accounts and refers to 
GNP as "Gross national income" or GNI” (WB, 2018a). GNI, GDP, and GNP not only 
indicate the size of the economy of a country but also indicates how strong or weak a 
country’s economy is because they represent the wellbeing of the economy and the 
economic growth (Investopedia, 2018a). It is safe to say that the higher GDP, GNI, and 
GNP of countries, the wealthy they are.   
The economic ability has been identified as one of the biggest influencers of 
the decision to host refugees, albeit not without some debate about the nature of the 
influence. Researchers’ arguments are well illustrated here: “research on 
international migration emphasizes economic conditions as the major determinant of 
a receiving country’s migration policies. Some refugee policy analysts argue that 
negative policy responses have coincided with periods of economic decline” 
(Jacobsen, 1996, pp. 666-667). In other words, when the economic conditions of the 
asylum countries are good, the probability that they will host more refugee will 
increase. If this explanation is true, then it means that wealthy countries with more 
economic ability would take more refugees than poorer countries who possess 
relatively fewer resources. However, is that the case in reality? Several examples are 
presented here that suggest the relationship between economic ability and the 




As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1, 85% of the world’s refugees 
are being hosted by the developing countries and the LDCs (UNHCR, 2017b). 
Additionally, when we consider that Turkey, a UMI country, hosted the highest 
number of refugees for the last four consecutive years, it is evident that even the rest 
of the 15% of the world’s refugees are unevenly distributed among the more 
developed countries. For example, let us consider the case of Japan. According to 
Reuters, in the first half of 2017 Japan had accepted only three refugees even though 
the country received 8,561 asylum applications and in 2016 Japan had accepted four 
refugees among the 5,011 applicants (Reuters, 2017). Table 2 shows the number of 
refugees that Japan recognized from 2006 to 2014 (LOC, 2016). 




34 41 57 30 39 21 18 6 11 
Resettled 
refugees 
0 0 0 0 27 18 0 18 23 
Special stay 
53 88 360 501 363 248 112 151 110 
Table 2: Japan’s Refugee Intake 2006-2014 (LOC, 2016)   
 
Meanwhile, Japan is a high-income, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) country. Its total wealth has increased by 12.7% from 1995 
to 2014, Table 3.  Additionally, Japan’s produced capital, including both natural 




capital has decreased by 7.6% as shown in Table 3 (Wealth Accounting, 2018). 
Considering Japan’s increasing economic ability and the declining nature of human 
capital, one may expect that the country would accommodate more refugees with 
ease. However, Table 2 illustrates a trend of decrease in the number of refugees 
hosted by Japan in the eight years between 2006-2014. The fact that in comparison 
to the wealth of Japan, the number of refugees the country has hosted has been 
disproportionately low, directly contradicts the logic that wealthy countries host 












64,533,910 68,732,334 65,573,815 68,123,308 72,710,058 12.7% 
Produced 
capital 
13,219,784 16,075,017 18,365,178 20,928,169 22,791,802 72.4% 
Natural 
capital 
428,703 411,578 409,974 468,037 475,645 10.9% 
Human 
capital 
50,264,704 51,213,262 45,309,195 44,180,055 46,423,123 -7.6% 
Net foreign 
assets 
620,718 1,032,478 1,489,468 2,547,046 3,019,487 386.5% 
Population 125,439,000 126,843,000 127,773,000 128,070,000 127,131,800 1.3% 
Table 3: Japan’s Wealth from 1995 to 2014 (Wealth Accounting, 2018) 
 
In contrast, Bangladesh, only recently promoted to the developing country 




example, the country accepted 932,204 refugees in the year 2017 (WB, 2018b; The 
Refugee Project, 2018b).  In total, Bangladesh was hosting 932,204 Rohingya refugees 
by the end of 2017; whereas more affluent neighbors India and Thailand were hosting 
18,089 and 99,982 Rohingya refugees respectively (The Refugee Project, 2018b). 
Bangladesh has been the biggest host of Rohingya refugees, even though the country 
lags behind India ($9.459 trillion) and Thailand ($1.234 trillion) in terms of economic 
ability by quite a large margin, with a GDP of $687.1 billion (CIA, 2018; The Refugee 
Project, 2018b). Added to that, Bangladesh has a land area of only 148,460 Sq. km 
which is respectively 22.5 and 3.5 times smaller than India (3,287,263 sq km) and 
Thailand (513,120 sq km) (CIA, 2018).  
Another recent example of rich neighbors not hosting refugees is present in a 
comparison between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. As seen in Figure 5, both countries are 
neighbor of Iraq. Figure 5 also depicts the much larger land area of Saudi Arabia 
compared to Jordan, and a larger shared border with Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, Jordan received more than 3 million Iraqi refugees whereas Saudi Arabia 
accepted a meager number of Iraqi refugees (approximately 2500). Table 4 shows the 
two countries’ acceptance of refugees on a year-by-year basis. Comparing the wealth 
and the area of the two countries would present a similarly lop-sided scenario, albeit 
in the opposite direction. Table 5 illustrates that Saudi Arabia is a much wealthier 
country compared to Jordan, and the difference in wealth has been increasing in time 
as well. In the last two decades, Saudi Arabia’s total wealth has increased by 145.9%, 




                                                              
 
Figure 5: Middle East Region (Uzayr, 2015) 
 
Year Saudi Arabia Jordan 
 2003 706 965 
2004 440 889 
2005 363 754 
2006 250 500000 
 2007 238 500000 
2008 38 500000 
2009 39 450000 
2010 39 450000 
2011 56 450000 
2012 50 63037 
2013 32 55509 
2014 32 29263 
2015 29 33256 
2016 31 33118 














6,441,927 6,770,907 8,928,385 12,824,357 15,840,744 145.9% 
Total wealth 
Jordan 
211,322 230,977 228,575 354,322 365,516 73.0% 
Table 5: Total Wealth of Saudi Arabia vs. Jordan  (Wealth Accounting, 2018) 
 
The above examples show a trend of less developed countries carrying a larger 
burden of refugees than more affluent neighbors. In 2004, UNHCR published a report 
in which it analyzed the number of refugees in relation to GDP per capita. The 
calculation showed that Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Islamic Republic of Iran, Zambia, Nepal, Guinea, and Sudan are the top ten 
host of refugees in relation to their GDP per capita (See Figure 6).   It also states: “as 
can be expected, the refugee burden in industrialized countries in relation to their 
GDP per capita is relatively small. The highest ranking industrialized country is 
Germany occupying the 38th position, followed by the United States (49th) and the 
United Kingdom (56th)” (UNHCR, 2004, p. 52).  In some of the poorest countries 
where GNP per capita is less than $170, such as Malawi, one in every ten persons is a 















In Chapter 3, based on the previous works, several factors behind a country’s 
decision to host refugees are discussed. Additionally, Chapter 4 provides ample 
indication that the relationship between economic ability of host states and the 
number of refugees received by asylum states may not be positively correlated, unlike 
the general expectation. As this study takes an inductive approach to investigate the 
relationship between states’ economic ability and the number of refugees received by 
states, for this purpose, the following null, and alternative hypotheses are adopted.  
Hypotheses 
H0: There is no relationship between the number of refugees hosted/ 
accepted/ received by host states and economic ability of host states. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the number of refugees 
hosted/accepted/received by host states and economic ability of host states. 
As per the hypotheses, the number of refugees hosted/accepted/received by 
host states is the dependent variable; and the economic ability of host states is the 





As previously stated, the dependent variable, for this study, is the total number 
of refugees entering a host country. The definition of refugee is operationalized based 
on the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The main reason to use UNHCR’s refugee definition is that UNHCR uses this 
very protocol to identify refugee status; and also, this study uses UNHCR’s refugee 
data to represent dependent variable. Thus, it is suitable to use the definition of 
refugee provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  
The UNHCR’s refugee data4 contains more than 290,000 entries ranging from 
1951 to 20165. The data is divided into five columns as presented in Table 6 (labels 
in Row 1): Year, Country/ Territory of Asylum/Residence, Country of Origin, Population 
Type, and Value. Country/ Territory of Asylum/Residence (column 2) refers to the host 
countries that gave the refugees asylum or residence. The dataset includes 198 
countries of asylum. Similarly, the Country of Origin (column 3) refers to all the 
countries the refugees are from or refugee-sending countries. In the dataset, there are 
222 countries of origins; but in many cases, the countries of origin of refugees are 
unknown and denoted by “Various/Unknown.”  Likewise, Population type (column 4) 
has nine categories: Asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDP), persons in IDP-
like situation, others of concern, returned IDPs, refugees (incl. refugee-like situations), 
                                                        
4 UNHCR refugee data was downloaded from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series  
website. 
5 According to the UNHCR website “each row of data represents the information about 
UNHCR's populations of concern for a given year and country of residence and/or origin. Data is 




returned refugees, persons in refugee-like situation and stateless persons.  Lastly, Value 
(column 5) indicates the number of refugees or other population types received by a 
host country.   
Year Country / territory 
of 
asylum/residence 
Origin Population type Value 








1965 Burundi Rwanda Returnees 4500 
1965 Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
Rwanda Returnees 1300 
1993 Afghanistan Afghanistan Internally 
displaced persons 
15000 
1993 Angola Angola Internally 
displaced persons 
88000 
1993 Armenia Armenia Internally 
displaced persons 
77000 
1993 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Internally 
displaced persons 
778000 
1997 Belarus Various/Unknown Others of concern 160000 
1997 Czech Rep. Stateless Others of concern 3300 
1997 Afghanistan Afghanistan Returned IDPs 4000 




Returned IDPs 58360 
1997 Cambodia Cambodia Returned IDPs 37899 
2000 Afghanistan Iraq Asylum-seekers 2 
2000 Afghanistan Tajikistan Asylum-seekers 1 
2004 Bangladesh Bangladesh Stateless 250000 
2004 Belarus Belarus Stateless 10465 
2004 Switzerland Switzerland Stateless 25 





Meanwhile, the downloaded dataset from UNHCR contained information that 
are not necessary for this study.  Hence, the data has been pre-processed through 
different steps before the actual analysis. First, this study is focusing on refugees only, 
not on all the other population types; such as stateless or asylum seekers. As a result, 
refugee (incl. refugee-like situation) is the only selected population type, and the rest 
of the population types are removed. Second, in the Value column, there are many 
values which indicate missing values by an asterisk (*) symbol 6, and those asterisk 
symbol values are also removed. Third, the dataset contained entries from 1951 till 
2016, whereas, data for independent variable starts from 1962. Thus, from 1951 to 
1961 refugee data are incompatible for this research. Therefore, observations from 
those years are removed from the dataset.  
After these three steps of pre-processing, there are around 95,000 entries. Yet, 
the dataset is not ready for analysis because most of the host countries have multiple 
entries for each year as they received refugees from different origins each year. Since 
every year many host countries received refugees from multiple origins, a new 
variable is needed to represent a total number of refugees for each host country per 
year. Therefore, a new variable, Total Refugees, is created which is the total number 
of refugees a host country received per year; and the calculation is done by adding all 
the values of the countries of origin for each host country each year. To illustrate, in 
1996 Australia received refugees from 103 countries of origin and a total of 67,313 
                                                        
6 “In the 2016 data, figures between 1 and 4 have been replaced with an asterisk (*). These 
represent situations where the figures are being kept confidential to protect the anonymity of 




refugees. Hence, the Total number of refugees for Australia in 1996 is 67,313. Thus, 
the Total Refugees represents the dependent variable: number of refugees a host 
country hosted/accepted/received per year.  
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is the economic ability of host states, which has been 
conceptualized in Chapter 4. As already discussed in Chapter 4, there is no direct way 
to define or measure economic ability; rather, GDP and GNI/GNP are indicators of 
economic ability. Thus, this study uses GNI per capita as the representative of 
economic ability. GNI per capita is defined as “the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of 
output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property 
income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year 
population” (UNICEF, 2018). Since GNI data includes all the national and abroad 
source of income of a country, it is a more accurate representation of economic ability 
than GDP which does not include all sources of income of a country. Additionally, the 
World Bank uses GNI data to classify countries into different categories such as high-
income, UMI, LMI, and low-income countries (UN, 2012).  The World Bank identifies  
Countries with less than $1,035 GNI per capita are classified as low-
income countries, those with between $1,036 and $4,085 as lower middle-
income countries, those with between $4,086 and $12,615 as upper middle-
income countries, and those with incomes of more than $12,615 as high-
income countries. GNI per capita in dollar terms is estimated using the World 




The World Bank is the source of GNI per capita data7. The dataset contains GNI 
per capita data from 1962 to 2016. However, many countries do not have GNI per 
capita data from 1962. Moreover, some countries are missing GNI per capita data for 
certain years but received refugees during those years.  As a result, available GNI per 
capita data was matched with available refugee data. For instance, Afghanistan’s GNI 
per capita data from 1962 to 2003 is unavailable but received 149,792 refugees from 
1990 to 2003. Since GNI per capita data for Afghanistan is not available from 1990 to 
2003, all refugee data of Afghanistan from 1962 to 2003 are removed; and the 
remaining refugee data from 2003 to 2016 and GNI per capita data are matched and 
marged.     
Control Variables 
For this study, two control variables: weighted distance and population 
density, are included. To illustrate, the initial relationship of this hypothesis is 
between the number of refugees hosted by states and the economic ability of host 
states, but the distance between home-host states, population and the land area of the 
host states potentially might influence states’ decision to host refugees. 
Weighted Distance 
A general trend of refugee migration is that refugees tend to travel to nearby 
states (WB, 2010).   Thus, asylum states who share a border with home state relatively 
                                                        





receive more refugees than asylum states who do not share any border. This trend is 
addressed in the Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development 
Challenge (2010) report. The report demonstrates that 75.19% of world’s refugees 
are hosted by countries who share land or maritime border with the home countries 
of refugee; whereas 24.81% of world’s refugees are hosted by the countries who do 
not share any border with the country of origin of refugee (WB, 2010).  Table 7 
represents the trend.  
 
Table 7: Breakdown of Number of Refugees in Host Countries by Border and Non-





Although the bordering countries generally received more refugees, some 
exceptions can be seen in Table 7. For example, non-bordering OECD countries have 
received 14.49% of refugee in contrast to bordering OECD countries are receiving 
only 0.33%. However, it is difficult to incorporate border in this study due to some of 
the concerning factors associated with it such as length of the borders, security in the 
border line between home-host countries, fence or wall in the border, geographical 
attributes of the border and quantifying the number of refugees hosted in relation to 
the border sharing.  
Even then, the distance between home and host countries usually have a great 
impact on the decision of refugee-hosting by countries. One of Kunz’s (1981) 
hypotheses is “distance of the native land from the country of asylum and the number 
of countries the refugee has to cross in his flight to get there, act as selective factors” 
(p. 51). In other words, distance between the asylum country and the home country 
is one of the main factors for the number of refugees in host countries.  
The distance data is obtained from the Center for Prospective Studies and 
International Information (CEPII)8. The dataset contains bilateral distances in 
kilometers for 225 countries (Mayer & Zignago, 2011a). The data calculates the 
distance from the capital city of one country to capital cities of all the other countries 
around the world as shown in the sample in Table 8 (Mayer & Zignago, 2011b, p. 10). 
Table 8 shows the distance between Aruba to other countries such as Afghanistan, 
                                                        
8 Distance data was downloaded from  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6  and this  study uses dist_cepii 




Angola, Anguilla, Albania, and others. To note, countries are denoted by their 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. 
Country 1 Country 2 Distance (kms) 
ABW AFG 13257.81 
ABW AGO 9516.913 
ABW AIA 983.2682 
ABW ALB 9091.742 
ABW ARE 12735.01 
ABW ARG 5396.22 
Table 8: Sample Distance Data (Mayer & Zignago, 2011a). 
 
However, bilateral distance data does not represent the distribution of 
refugees in relation to distance, because most of the host countries often received 
refugees from multiple home countries. As neither the distance nor the number of 
refugees from each home country is the same, therefore weighted distance in relation 
to the number of refugees was considered, which is an appropriate metric of the 
distance parameter. The weighted distance is calculated by using the following 
formulae.  
𝐴 =  𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  
𝐵 =  𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1 
𝐶 =  𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 2  
𝐷 =  𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 3 




(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐶) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 =  𝑄 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐷) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐷 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 =  𝑅  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 =  𝑍 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 =  




Suppose, Belgium is a host country who received 10 refugees from 
Afghanistan, 200 from Syria and 100 from Iraq in 2017. Moreover, the distance from 
Belgium to Afghanistan is 5416.121, to Syria 3226.327 and to Iraq 3775.806.  
𝐴 =  𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚 (𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)   
𝐵 =  𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1) 
𝐶 =  𝑆𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 2)  
𝐷 =  𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 (𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 3)  
 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐵) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 
=  5416.121 × 10 =  54,161 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐶) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 
=  3226.327 × 200 =  645,265 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴 𝑡𝑜 𝐷) × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐷 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴 
=  3775.806 × 100 = 377,580 




𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛 2017 =  
541,612 + 645,265 + 37,758 
310
= 3,474 
Weighted distance balances the distribution of refugees and bilateral 
distances, which cannot be done by using a simple sum of bilateral distances.  In the 
above example of Belgium, the total distance from the three countries will be 12,417 
without the weighted distance, and this does not reflect the variation in the number 
of refugees; but with the weighted distance, it is 3474, which reflects the number of 
refugees as well as bilateral distance. 
Population Density 
Kunz (1981) theorizes that countries with high population usually receive 
fewer number of refugees than countries that have a low population because highly 
populated countries usually have restricted population policy (Kunz, 1981). On the 
other hand, Jacobsen focuses on land availability and its impacts in hosting refugees. 
Her opinion is that “heavily populated regions are unlikely to have the land to support 
large numbers of newcomers; sparsely populated areas often have low population-
carrying capacity because of lack of water, poor soil, etc. Land availability also 
decreases when the government appropriates it for refugee camps” (Jacobsen, 1996, 
p. 667). Thus, two prominent scholars emphasize the importance of the host country’s 
population and land availability, but separately they make less sense. For instance, a 
country has 50 million people, but a small land area verses another country which 
also has 50 million people but a larger land area. Therefore, a combinatiion of both 




land availability of a country because population density “calculated as population 
divided by total land area” (Countries by Population Density, 2015). Hence, the 
second control variable is population density. The dataset is extracted from the World 
Bank’s 9 website.   The population density data is matched with refugee data, GNI per 
capita data and weighted distance data.  
Datasets 
There are quite a few challenges with the dataset. The very first challenge is 
refugees from “unknown/various” places. The problem is incorporating these 
unknown origins of refugees with the weighted distance measurement. Since 
weighted distance requires distance measurement between the host country and the 
country of origin, it is impossible to measure weighted distance for the refugees who 
are from unknown places. Hence, for the refugees who are from unknown places, 
there is no distance or weighted distance data. However, from 1951 to 2016 around 
84,033,330 refugees were from unknown places, which is a significant number; 
similarly, between 1951 to 1961, 17,496,852 refugees were from unknown places 
and from 1962 to 2016, a total of   66,536,478 refugees were from unknown places. 
Without incorporating these refugees from unknown origin, the result would be 
biased. Due to this complexity in data, two different datasets are created from the 
UNHCR refugee data, World Bank GNI per capita data, weighted distance, and 
population density data. Those two datasets are organized by using two processes as 
                                                        





shown in Figure 7. The first dataset maintains the simple data organization 
procedures previously mentioned; after calculating Total Refugees, GNI per capita 
data and population density data are matched based on year and country.  On the 
other hand, for the second dataset, all “unknown/various” data are removed. Then 
the weighted distance and Total Refugees are calculated separately. Lastly, all the 
three datasets- refugee data, weighted distance data, and population data, are 
matched according to year and country.  
 
Figure 7: Data Organization Process of First Dataset and Second Dataset 
 
Data Organization Process 
First Dataset
Step 1: Removed data from UNHCR refugee data
1. All population type except refugee (incl. 
refugee- like situation)
2. All  *
3. All data from 1951 to 1961
Step 2
Created "Total Refugees" by calculating total 
refugees per country per year 
Step 3
Matched refugee data, GNI per capita data and 
population density data by year and country
Second Dataset
Step 1: Removed data from UNHCR refugee data
1. All population type except refugee (incl. 
refugee- like situation)
2. All *
3. All data from 1951 to 1974
4. All "Unknown/Various"
Step 2: 
Calculated weighted istance by using UNHCR data 
and bilateral distance data
Step 3:
Created "Total  Refugees" by calculating total 
refugees per country per year 
Step 4: 
Matched refugee data, GNI per capita data, 
weighted diatnce data and population density 





The first data set includes all the “unknown/various” origin but excludes 
weighted distance, since contributions in weighted distance from unknown origin 
will be 0. The first dataset has 5201 data points and covers 55 years from 1962 to 
2016. A sample extract of the dataset can be seen in Table 9.  
Year Host Country Total GNI Per 
Capita  
Population Density 
1962 Austria 30000 1060 86.34 
1962 Burundi 30000 70 112.68 
1962 Canada 12282 2340 2.05 
1962 Congo, (Kinshasa) 223000 230 7.08 
1962 France 259740 1560 87.88 
1962 Greece 15700 630 65.54 
1962 Italy 14300 960 172.99 
1962 Netherlands 10000 1220 349.69 
1962 Norway 3000 1610 9.96 
1962 Spain 2000 500 62.07 
1962 Sweden 26000 2310 18.43 
1962 Togo 5000 90 29.65 
1962 United States of 
America 
500000 3280 20.37 
Table 9: Sample Excerpt from the First Dataset without Weighted Distance  
 
Second Dataset 
Meanwhile, the second dataset excludes unknown variables and includes 
weighted distance. Additionally, from 1951 to 1974 most of the refugees are from 




starts from 1975 to 2016. The second dataset has 3293 observations. A sample 
extract of the second dataset is presented in Table 10. 






1975 Algeria 20350 910 7.02 2019.946 
1975 Argentina 15060 2700 9.53 1098.113 
1975 Cameroon 30000 350 15.78 301.903 
1975 Congo (Brazzaville) 5000 480 4.66 556.9467 
1975 Gabon 60000 2860 2.52 380.9314 
1975 Greece 510 3480 70.18 136.4572 
1975 Kenya 1850 250 23.7 1754.562 
1975 Lesotho 190 230 37.9 405.7573 
1975 Morocco 390 540 39.89 2272.929 
1975 Peru 600 1100 11.9 2468.643 
1975 Philippines 690 380 138.5 1750.016 
1975 Rwanda 7400 100 176.7 180.006 
1975 Senegal 46000 440 25.64 364.4693 
1975 Sudan 91000 370 6.82 996.0536 
1975 Thailand 75760 380 82.87 536.6375 
Table 10: Sample Excerpt from the Second Dataset with Weighted Distance 
 
Method 
Due to the nature of the data, with both cross-sectional and time series 
properties, panel data analysis is appropriate in this study. According to Oscar 
Torres-Reyna (2010) “Panel data (also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-
series data) is a dataset in which the behavior of entities is observed across time. 
These entities could be states, companies, individuals, and countries” (Torres-Reyna, 
2010).   This definition implies that panel data has two dimensions: 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =




There are two types of panel data, balanced and unbalanced. Balanced panel 
data indicates that data for all individuals available for all the time periods of the 
dataset. In other words, “the number of time periods T is the same for all individuals 
i” (Mayer M. , 2010); whereas unbalanced data implies that some of the data points 
are missing, and those data points are not synchronized throughout the entire time 
periods of the dataset (Torres-Reyna, 2010). An example of balanced and unbalanced 
panel data is shown in Table 11. Both the first and the second datasets of this study 
have a common characteristic that the number of time periods T is not the same for 
all the countries i. This means that both datasets of this study have unbalanced panel 
data. 
 
Table 11: Example of Balanced and Unbalanced Panel Data (Mayer M. , 2010) 
 
Meanwhile, there are a few ways panel data can be modeled, but for this study, 
only two of them are relevant: fixed effects and random effects models (Frees, 2004). 




the test yields a significant p-value of <0.05, then the fixed effect modeling approach 
is more appropriate; otherwise, a random effect model is recommended. In this case, 
the Hausman test resulted in a p-value of 0.6; therefore, the random effect model is 
more appropriate for this study, according to the Hausman test (Torres-Reyna, 2010).  
Summary statistics of the Hausman Test done in R is presented here: 
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎:  𝑌 ~ 𝑋 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑞 =  1.4349, 𝑑𝑓 =  3, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  0.6974 
𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠: 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 
However, in case, fixed effects model can control for time-invariant individual 
differences (Frees, 2004), which is a necessary criterion considering the host 
countries have undergone many changes unaccounted for in the independent 
variables used in this study. With the empirical results suggesting a better choice to 
be random effects model, and the characteristics of both datasets suggesting fixed 












RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
The data analysis is done with four panel data models: fixed and random 
effects models for each of the first and second datasets. For all panel data models, year 
and host country are the two units of analyses. 
Results from Analysis of the First Dataset 
As stated previously, in the first dataset dependent variable is the total 
number of refugees; the independent variable is GNI per capita, and the control 
variable is population density.   The first dataset covers 178 countries, 55 years and 
5201 observations. For both datasets, both fixed effects and random effects models 
are stimulated in RStudio, and the coefficients of each variable are shown in Table 12, 
(Please refer to Appendices III and IV for more detail). 
Model type GNI per capita  Population Density  
Fixed Effects Model -2.31446*** 2.17239 
Random Effects Model  -2.11621*** 1.46610 
Statistical Significance Highly Significant Not Significant 
Table 12: Result of Fixed and Random Effects Models of the First Dataset (***: 





For the fixed effects model, results demonstrate that there is a negative 
relationship between the number of refugees received by countries and GNI per 
capita of the countries. More specifically, the coefficient of GNI per capita indicates 
that, with one unit increment of GNI per capita of a host country, the number of 
refugees received by the host state decreases by 2.3 people on an average10 
(Appendix III). Additionally, the correlation is highly statistically significant 
(p<0.001). Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted. In contrast, population density has a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable, but the correlation is not statistically significant.  
Similar to the fixed effects model, the result of the random effects model also 
shows a negative correlation between GNI per capita and the number of refugees 
hosted by states, with high statistical significance (p<0.001), and supports the 
alternate hypothesis. The estimates of the coefficient of GNI per capita is also quite 
close to the fixed effects model’s coefficient; and it implies that when GNI per capita 
for countries increases by one unit across time and between countries, the number of 
refugees received by a host state decreases by 2.1 people on average (Appendix IV). 
Contrarily, population density is positively correlated with the dependent variable, 
but the relationship is not statistically significant. 
As a summary, analysis of the first dataset contradicts the accepted notion that 
the decision to host refugees depends on the countries’ economic ability. Rather, both 
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results indicate that countries show less inclination to take refugees as the GNI per 
capita increases. Additionally, the population density do not show a negative 
relationship that is statistically significant, raising doubts over the notion that less 
densely populated countries take more refugees. 
Results from Analysis of the Second Dataset 
As opposed to the first dataset, the second dataset has an extra control 
variable, weighted distance, along with all other elements of the first dataset. The 
second dataset presents 145 countries, 42 years and 3293 observations (which is 
1908 fewer observations from the first dataset).  Both fixed and random effects 
models were run in RStudio on this dataset, and the results are presented in Table 13, 
(please also see Appendices V and VI for detailed results). 
For the fixed effects model, the result again indicates a statistically significant 
(p<0.05) negative correlation between GNI per capita and refugee intake by states. 
The coefficient of GNI per capita indicates that on average with one unit increase in 
GNI per capita, the number of refugees hosted by states decreases by around one 
person (0.9). As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternate hypothesis 
is accepted. Similarly, a negative correlation is achieved for the weighted distance, 
with high statistical significance (p<0.001). The correlation between population 











-0.9* 5.71 -11.18*** 
Random 
Effects Model  
-0.88* 4.1 -11.15*** 
Statistical 
Significance  
Significant  Not Significant Highly Significant 
Table 13: Result of Fixed and Random Effects Models of the Second Dataset (***: 
p<0.001, **: 0.001<p<0.01, *: 0.01<p<0.05) 
 
Just like the fixed effects model, the correlation between GNI per capita and 
the number of refugees hosted by states is negative and statistically significant for the 
random effects model of the second dataset (Appendix VI); based on the result the 
null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.   The coefficient 
of GNI per capita is also close to that of the fixed effects model, approximately 0.88. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient indicates that across time and between countries, when 
GNI per capita for countries increases by one unit the number of refugees hosted by 
states decreases by around one person on an average. Also similar to the fixed effects 
model, the number of refugees hosted by states is negatively correlated with 
weighted distance and the relationship is statistically significant. In contrast, the 
number of refugees hosted by states is positively correlated with population density, 
and the relationship is not statistically significant. 
In both cases, weighted distance shows a highly significant negative 




distance increases by one unit (Km) per country the number of refugees hosted by a 
state decreases by 11 people. This result implies that Kunz hypothesis is correct. It 
also indicates that distance matters when choosing a destination by refugees. 
Meanwhile, for both cases, population density is positively correlated and not 
statistically significant.  
One noticeable difference between the results of both datasets is that the 
coefficient of GNI per capita of the second dataset is lower than GNI per capita of the 
first dataset. One of the main reasons for this difference is that the second dataset 
lacks 1908 observations since it excluded refugees from unknown origin. 
Furthermore, weighted distance might have some impact on the GNI per capita 
coefficient.  
In summary, the second dataset supports the findings from the first dataset, 
that increasing economic ability of host states does not warrant an increase in refugee 
intake; rather, the converse is true. Additionally, results also indicate that the distance 
between home and host states is an important factor in regulating the number of 
refugees. 
Discussions and Implications 
For all four models, with the two datasets and two different model types, GNI 
per capita shows a negative correlation with the number of refugees hosted by states. 
In all cases, the relationship is found to be statistically significant. The result 




become less likely to host refugees. Meanwhile, there are few crucial questions 
regarding the results that need to be addressed. First, what could be a possible reason 
for this negative correlation? Second, many countries host a relatively large number 
of refugees; and their GNI per capita would show positive correlations with the 
number of refugees they host. How one may explain the negative correlation for all 
countries in general, despite the positive correlation for some countries? Lastly, is the 
finding generalizable?    
To address the first question, in the last 55 years GNI per capita has mostly 
been increasing for all the countries, so does the number of world refugees.  The time 
trend graph in Figure 8 is showing the differences of growth for both variables. Even 
though the number of refugees has been increasing at an alarming rate, GNI per capita 
for all the host countries have not increased in proportion to the number of refugees 
they are capable of hosting, especially for the low-income countries. On the other 
hand, high-income countries’ GNI per capita have been increasing, in most cases 20-
100 times more than low-income countries, but in comparison to low-income 
countries, high- income countries hosted fewer refugees, which can be seen in Figure 
9. The left side of the scatter plot, Figure 9, displays that most of the LMI and low-
income countries hosted a large number of refugees; in contrast, the middle and right 
side of the plot is showing a low number of refugees hosted by the high-income 
countries. The regression line in the scatter plot of GNI per capita and Total Refugees 




Moreover, many high-income, as well as UMI countries, hosted more refugees 
in the past, but over time their refugee intake has declined. For instance, in years 
1970,1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, Australia hosted 42,000, 304,000, 97,915, 60,246, 
and 21,805 refugees respectively.  Since this is not just one event rather a chain of 
events across time, the negative correlation is an indicator of that.  
To better understand the dynamics of the relationship, suppose in 2010 an 
LMI host country had GNI per capita 1000$ for which it could host 100 refugees, but 
it hosted 1000. Next year, its GNI per capita had increased to 1100 for which it could 
host 110 refugees but then because of the increased number of world’s refugees, in 
2011 the country had to host 1500 refugees. Similarly, suppose there is a high-income 
host country, which had GNI per capita 10,000$ for which it could host 1000 refugees, 
but it hosted only 200 refugees. Next year, its GNI per capita had increased to 11,000 
for which it could host 1100 refugees, but then in 2011, that country hosted only 150 
refugees. Thus, there are three differences; first, low and high GNI per capita, second 
number of refugees they hosted, and third, the increase and decrease number of 
refugees hosted by both countries. All these three differences GNI per are few of the 






Figure 8: Time Trend Graph of GNI per capita and Total Number of Refugees hosted by States (1962-2016) (ExPanDaR R 


















Besides all those three reasons, there are many countries who hosted a low 
number of refugees in the last 55 years as seen in Figure 10, which displays an 
average number of refugees hosted by countries in the last 55 years.  In Figure 10, 
there are 55 countries whose mean of the total number of refugees hosted in the last 
55 years are almost 0.  Furthermore, a lot of these countries are high income; such as 
South Korea, Brunei Darussalam, Palau, Bahamas, Iceland, Singapore, Bahrain, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Uruguay, Slovenia, and Slovakia. There are also low-
income, LMI and UMI countries on the list. 
Similarly, there are many countries whose mean of hosted refugees over 55 
years are less than 50,000, 100,000 and 200,000. High income, UMI, LMI, and low-
income countries are also included on that list, which implies that countries do not 
host refugees based on equality or equity and therefore, some countries end up with 
hosting more refugees than others. Another point is high-income countries host 
relatively low number of refugees, and because of that, it suppressed the other 
scenarios.  
Moving forward to the second question, positive correlation of countries who 
hosted a high number of refugees, but not reflecting in the result.  A bi-polar 
correlation of countries, for each country one correlation from 1962 to 2016, Figure 
11, shows the right-side countries have a positive correlation, and left side countries 
have a negative correlation. There are 94 countries with a negative correlation and 




correlation prevailed in the results and suppressed the positive correlation.  Even 
though many countries whose correlation is positive some of them are misleading 
such as Qatar from 2004 to 2015 Qatar only received a Total of 820 refugees and it 
was a gradual increase from 46 to 80 to 133; therefore, it shows a positive correlation. 
In contrast, from 1979 to 2016 Pakistan received a total of 71,127,749 refugees, but 
its correlation is negative because in recent years it received fewer refugees than the 
past. Even though there are some glitches, overall it represents most of the countries 
accurately.  
Lastly, the question is how generalizable this result is? One of the limitations 
of panel data is that it lacks generalizability for a population that was not considered 
for the study (Valente, 2002, p. 93). However, this study has not used any sample 
rather used the whole available population size as well as time periods. Thus, the 





Figure 11: Each Countries’ Bi-polar Correlation Plot of GNI per capita and Total Number of Refugees hosted by Countries 







This research starts with a concern regarding the growing number of refugees 
in the world, and a shocking number of those refugees are hosted by the developing 
regions or the Third World.  The research question becomes what factors most often 
explain states’ behavior towards refugees. Inspired by the works of academics and 
scholars; examining the discrepancy in refugee hosting by the wealthy states such as 
Japan and Saudi Arabia; and then applying inductive logic, the study draws the 
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between economic ability of host 
states and the number of refugees hosted by states. By applying the panel data 
analysis methods, the study examines that relationship.  
There are many challenges while working with panel data especially the initial 
datasets are scattered into four different sets and need to be organized in certain 
ways to analyze. There are many missing values, and unbalanced panel data. 
Moreover, refugees from unknown origin become problamatic for calculating 
weighted distance. To solve the problem, the study creates two datasets; and applies 
fixed effects and random effects models to analyze both datasets. 
 Meanwhile, results from four models show that the correlation between the 




statistically significant. The result implies that most of the states’ host fewer refugees 
when they get wealthier. Even though in general that is the trend, a deeper analysis 
presents the reasons behind this correlation.   
Meanwhile, the term refugee challenges the status quo of states. Refugees are 
special types of foreigners as “they are neither inter-state relations nor center–
periphery, state– citizen or citizen–citizen relations” (Sicakkan, 2012, p. 359).  In one 
hand, states have the right to determine who can enter its territory and who cannot, 
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, Westphalia Treaty of 1648, and the Wilsonian principles 
of 1918 (Sicakkan, 2012). On the other hand, the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its related 1967 Protocol, insist that the state to do the other 
way; “by granting refugee status to foreigners, a state abandons its right to decide on 
their movements across its territory as well as its own discretion about how to treat 
foreigners. The state is also obliged by the Geneva Convention to guarantee civil and 
social rights to refugees” (Sicakkan, 2012, p. 359). Thus, in the asylum country 
refugees are alien. They might, or they might not represent a nationality, but as soon 
as they obtain a nationality, their refugee status would disappear (Vernant, 1953).   
There is no doubt that geographically, the Third World or the developing 
regions are the largest producers of refugees and migrants as well as asylum zone 
(Malkki, 1995, p. 503). However, the North played a huge role in the creation of those 
refugees in the Third World during and after the decolonization period.  Thus, they 




States go through different calculation to host refugees such as economic 
ability, security, national interest, local economic capacity, international assistant, 
foreign policy, and home-host relationship. However, refugee protection is a global 
public good; and it is an important factor to stabilize the nation-state system since 
these people are vulnerable and can join terrorist groups and create instability.  It is 
also important to remember that some states are free riders and others are taking the 
burden. Thus, it is high time to create a comprehensive law to define the role of states 
who do not host refugee or host a small portion of refugee. It is also true that some 
states are capable of hosting more refugees, high-income as well as UMI, and some 
cases LMI; and some are not, especially low-income countries. Thus, the protection of 
refugees has come mostly from high-income and UMI countries.  
Scopes for Future Research 
This study could not explore a few aspects such as national interest, foreign 
policy, international assistance, and home-host relationship. All of these come under 
one umbrella. Therefore, there is a chance for further study that can look at those 
factors and how those affect refugee hosting. The second research could be on 
cultural compatibilities such as language, religion, and ethnicity. How cultural 
compatibilities impact in hosting refugees.  There can also be a comparative study of 
changing dynamics of refugee hosting during and after the Cold War era. For example, 
how refugee hosting changes in two different time periods. Lastly, there can be 
another research on the changing dynamics of the refugee problem such as distance 




because refugee crisis in Europe showed that when refugees are well informed they 
are willing to take the risk and go to Europe instead of living in the refugee camps in 







Appendix I: Developed Economies 








Appendix II:  Economies by Per Capita GNI 
 













plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "within") 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 178, T = 1-55, N = 5201 
 
Residuals: 
      Min.    1st Qu.     Median    3rd Qu.       Max.  
-1085195.6   -37580.2    -5313.8    14077.0  3093981.5  
 
Coefficients: 
        Estimate Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
XGNI_pc -2.31446    0.30653 -7.5505 5.121e-14 *** 
XPopDen  2.17239    3.73605  0.5815     0.561     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    2.3466e+14 
Residual Sum of Squares: 2.3201e+14 
R-Squared:      0.01131 
Adj. R-Squared: -0.023937 















Appendix IV: First Dataset Random Effects Model 
Summary 
> summary(random_effects) 
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model  
   (Swamy-Arora's transformation) 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "random") 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 178, T = 1-55, N = 5201 
 
Effects: 
                    var   std.dev share 
idiosyncratic 4.621e+10 2.150e+05 0.653 
individual    2.459e+10 1.568e+05 0.347 
theta: 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 0.1921  0.7449  0.7856  0.7671  0.8039  0.8182  
 
Residuals: 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
-889500  -43429  -22602    1735    6950 3289251  
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 90076.62433 12563.00562  7.1700 8.551e-13 *** 
XGNI_pc        -2.11621     0.29491 -7.1757 8.206e-13 *** 
XPopDen         1.46610     3.61502  0.4056    0.6851     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    2.4015e+14 
Residual Sum of Squares: 2.3798e+14 
R-Squared:      0.009124 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0087428 










Appendix V: Second Dataset Fixed Effects Model 
Summary 
summary(fixed_within) 
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "within") 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-42, N = 3293 
 
Residuals: 
    Min.  1st Qu.   Median  3rd Qu.     Max.  
-1565511   -25700    -4005    16470  2562371  
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
XGNI_pc             -0.95729    0.38648 -2.4770    0.0133 *   
XPopDen              5.71400    6.88434  0.8300    0.4066     
Xweighted_distance -11.18175    2.15744 -5.1829 2.323e-07 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    1.402e+14 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1.381e+14 
R-Squared:      0.014947 
Adj. R-Squared: -0.031096 
























Appendix VI: Second Dataset Random Effects Model 
Summary 
summary(random_effects) 
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model  
   (Swamy-Arora's transformation) 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = plm_ref_data, model = "ra
ndom") 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-42, N = 3293 
 
Effects: 
                    var   std.dev share 
idiosyncratic 4.391e+10 2.096e+05 0.472 
individual    4.921e+10 2.218e+05 0.528 
theta: 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 0.3133  0.7981  0.8211  0.8126  0.8445  0.8558  
 
Residuals: 
    Min.  1st Qu.   Median     Mean  3rd Qu.     Max.  
-1227932   -36211   -19207      604     8597  2900006  
 
Coefficients: 
                      Estimate  Std. Error t-value  P
r(>|t|)     
(Intercept)         1.1763e+05  1.9670e+04  5.9802 2.
467e-09 *** 
XGNI_pc            -8.8385e-01  3.7861e-01 -2.3345   
0.01963 *   
XPopDen             4.1767e+00  6.5968e+00  0.6331   
0.52668     
Xweighted_distance -1.1148e+01  2.1198e+00 -5.2589 1.
542e-07 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 
0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    1.4627e+14 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1.4417e+14 
R-Squared:      0.01434 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.013441 
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